



WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY: BUSINESS AS USUAL?

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About Serena Cruz

Serena Cruz will receive her doctoral degree in International Relations from Florida International University at the end of 2015. Her thesis research explored how women manage daily risks associated with HIV/AIDS, criminalization, and sex work in the slums of Kampala, Uganda. Her research interests revolve around gender, conflict, and sexual violence, especially in the context of DR Congo and Syrian refugees in Lebanon. She has also worked on men's social networks in Kampala slums.

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What's Sexual Violence Got To Do with the Economy? The Case of the DRC

By Serena Cruz & Helen Hintjens

The members of the Mapping Team were able to observe the constant fear on the part of affected populations that history would repeat itself, especially when yesterday's attackers are returning in positions that enable them to commit new crimes with complete impunity.¹



Introduction

Sex and money are ancient allies. And nowhere has the alliance between economic interests, violence, sexual violence, and forced labour been closer than in Congo-Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire.

At the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, which carved up the African continent south of the Sahara, King Leopold of Belgium persuaded Western powers that he would oversee a “Free Congo,” where businesses from every corner could easily establish themselves and make a profit. Shortly after the conference, as Leopold's company officials started arriving, an area larger than present-day Western Europe had been veritably turned over to one man. Soon the people who lived in what was now “Leopold's Congo” were to discover the so-called free market norms of nineteenth-century imperialist capitalism - and the sting of its lash.

Everyday economic activity became the single main cause of violent deaths, rapes, and mutilations of an estimated ten million people in the span of just a few decades. Several accounts, including Adam Hochschild's book *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (discussed more below), have given a wider audience a better understanding of how the personal story of Leopold, who never set foot in Congo, ensured that economic extraction and growth of the Congolese economy would be based on widespread, systematized physical violence, killings, whippings, and sexual violence. The notorious Force Publique, the colonial police force overseen by a few Belgian officers, did the king's dirty work, enforcing punishments, as they themselves were under threat of sanctions. In eastern DRC, a particularly predatory form of armed capitalism still prevails. In this paper we propose that the unholy alliance of economic interests, forced labour, sexual predation, and killings that Leopold established from 1884 onwards resulted in structures of predatory, violence-based capital accumulation that persist today.

Expanding the sphere of private economic interests and doing what is usually termed “economic development” may therefore prove altogether insufficient to reduce poverty, violence, and sexual violence. For the Congolese, it seems that deeper structural transformations will be needed before the economic and social structures can deliver peaceful forms of development.

This is because the economic infrastructure is underpinned by systematic physical violence, which includes pervasive sexual violence. Collusion with this predatory economy has produced a gendered economic machine that relies on physical and moral enslavement of the population. It uses sexual violence as a weapon of choice to discipline and terrorize fragile local communities and turn them against one another.²

It is the extraction - first of rubber, later of timber and minerals - that has impelled this gendered economic system based on pillage and the bodily wastage of men and women. To tackle sexual violence, we propose, requires transforming the entire economic system, root and branch, even before it makes sense to tackle Congolese men's masculinities or to promote gender equality through training and education. Only when alternatives to forced labor are found and made profitable will significant reform of Congo's economic system be possible.

So how did sexual violence become part and parcel of the economic and social infrastructure of the country? Let's begin by tracing back some of the history of this gendered form of violence, starting with 1884.

Women, Warriors, and Wars

Scholars posit that the nexus between "security" and "development" has grown greater, notably since 2001. These two fields of operation overlap in ways previously not recognized or imagined. In eastern DRC, the military has become involved in development work as a part of the reconstruction process, and NGOs and humanitarian agencies also operate in insecure zones of fighting and violence, sometimes under private or UN military protection. Private companies play a growing role in security provision in such circumstances, often muddying the waters and generating, rather than reducing, insecurity.³ For Congo's case, this comes as no surprise - in the country's history, private armed forces have been the norm, not the exception. Under Leopold's dominion, which lasted from 1884 till 1908, when the Belgian state took over the bankrupt colony, each private company involved paid dues. The funds were mainly for the Force Publique, which, in turn, used force to protect the companies' investments. In eastern DRC especially, it is not that surprising: in light of a long history of predatory capitalism, closer relations between security and development tend to increase insecurity rather than feelings of security among the local population. In October 2014, when civilian survivors of an attack by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) turned to attack the UN compound in North Kivu, it was clear that their shattered expectations of finding protection under UN auspices had spilled over into rage.

The mineral trade and sexual violence tend to follow one another, with pervasive and institutionalized practices of forced labor. Men, women, children, young and old, are conscripted as forced labor, made to work for nothing or next to nothing. Sexual violence, carried out in a way that is intended to destroy social bonds of family and loyalty, is often the prelude to enslavement and forced labor. Gender-based violence (GBV) and the forced fragmentation of communities thus go hand in hand. As individuals become unanchored from their support systems, wealth accumulation proceeds through sheer physical force.

"Pillage capitalism" is thus deeply rooted, and continues to reproduce itself at the expense of the vast majority of the Congolese population. The economic and political "system... rewards illicit trade and discourages legal and stable commerce."⁴ In this context, sexual violence is not merely something men commit: it is symptomatic of deeply embedded structures that make up the coercive political economy. Overcoming legacies of inter-gender and inter-community violence is *the* major challenge in eastern DRC today, particularly for women.

Although women from these communities have undoubtedly emerged and come to maintain informal positions of leadership, their roles as community leaders are seriously compromised by the pervasive physical threats against them. Yet, it seems to have taken at least 15 years to alert the world to the devastating impact of the poisonous legacies of an eastern DRC political economy on the lives of women. In acknowledgment, some recent signs of social change offer hope of growing awareness of the gendered nature of women's place in local economies,

communities, and the larger political and economic nexus of DRC's violent forms of production.⁵

Central to exploitative production is the extraction of labor from men and women by force and captivity. As men are continually the first line of conscripted actors in the system of violent production, women are left to fend for their own safety, with few lines of support. What results is a means of coping, whereby "[a]longside these male-centered difficulties are new divisions of labor born out of the conflict" and whereby "[w]omen are often more likely to be involved in small commercial activities."⁶ Witnessing incremental changes to localized intra-community gender norms of power "has been interpreted by men as breeding female emancipation at the expense of male authority."⁷ Punishment for being independent is never far away for those women who manage to exercise relative economic independence.

As the perception that women are "moving ahead" is allowed to flourish, sexual violence competes alongside women's abilities to develop as local leaders. Many young men are unable to get a "decent" living or marry, and, for them, a gun may become a means of livelihood. They may seize others' land, coerce unarmed people to work for them in mines, and use sexual violence and threat of arms to achieve their goal of making a living "as a man."⁸ In this context, civilians and military, alike, can become forced laborers, as "losers... become slaves, and...an entire group can be forced to give up its corporate integrity [including] its claim to [an] autonomous control over women."⁹ As such, the armed war economy ensures that violent conflict will re-emerge at the locus of women's bodies. Sexual violence is also a means through which claims to livelihood are staked out by competing armed actors, economic as well as military, in the search for low-cost or enslaved labor for mines, transport, and armed groups.

In an effort to thwart the dichotomizing notion of gendered power, entrenched in local communities, women survivors of sexual violence are organizing collective actions to protest their mass violation. In 2010, women survivors gathered in Bukavu to confront violence against women. Known as "V-Day," the event was meant to spotlight their plight to the international community. The women called for an end to sexual violence, an end to impunity for perpetrators, and breaking taboos that engender shame in victims. They also demanded: "[T]he international community must act on behalf of Congolese women and girls whether or not it serves their economic or political self-interest." This instance made it clear that Congolese women, themselves, were connecting the ways in which the production systems in eastern DRC operate as part of an economy of violence. They also endeavored to show how systematic sexual violence had become part and parcel of a normalized violence in the production system overseen by military forces.

Sexual Violence and the Profit Motive: A Short History

Sexual violence thus has multiple meanings, causes, and consequences. In DRC, most sexual violence does seem embedded in wider patterns of using physical force, or violence, to push people about and earn money off their sweat. Local communities are forced to give their labor for free, to work in dangerous conditions for nothing or next to nothing, in mines and within armed militias.¹⁰ Masculine ideals have been profoundly affected by historical practices of coercive labor and a violent sexual economy, which interconnects forced laboring with all other aspects of reproduction, especially in mining and forest areas.¹¹ War-based political economies of eastern DRC's regions, such as North and South Kivu and Ituri, reflect in many ways a typical pattern firmly established by colonial forms coerced labor systems, starting with Leopold's "rubber terror."¹²

The longer-term historical analysis adopted in this paper highlights strong precedents for what is being documented today by NGOs and human rights organizations. That is, a complex nexus of human insecurity, sexual violence, and labor enslavement for economic gain. There are similarities to be drawn with the slave plantations of the southern United States, characterized by brutal acts comparable to those found in colonial Congo, except that in Congo entire settled communities were involved.¹³

American plantation owners, like Leopold's agents, relied on physical and sexual violence and the threat of violence to extract surplus and make a profit.

The colonial regime, the regime of Mobutu and the rebellions of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo [ADFL, led by Laurent Kabila] and the RCD have each demonstrated that force is the means to power.¹⁴

The prevalence of forced labor, imposed taxes, with inadequate or no pay, continues today, usually under the barrel of a gun. In colonial times, the whip and the gun both reigned supreme, impelled, in turn, by the profit motive.¹⁵ Under Leopold, an economic logic became entrenched that explicitly involved sexual violence, which was recorded as a practice of the Force Publique, the Congolese police force, and various company agents. Kidnapping village females en masse was almost routine under Leopold's regime, a way to force village men to supply rubber to the company. Abductees would be kept, caged like animals, until the men returned with the requisite quantity of rubber. If enough rubber was collected, the village females were returned. In other cases, they died, were killed, raped, and/or starved. The level of violence was such that many communities fled in the wake of Force Publique soldiers' advance, yielding a despoiled landscape in some parts of the country.¹⁶ Those who refused to comply or brought insufficient rubber could be punished through the organized raping and killing of their wives and the killing of children and elders.¹⁷

As its violent past haunts the US today, so do the ghosts of a colonial past plague the Congolese. Legacies of colonialism remain brutally visible in specific violent methods used to coerce local people to collect and deliver services - be it forest timber, minerals, or violence itself as a forced militia member. It is important to understand the gender dimensions of this comparison. Dorothy Roberts, for example, brings to light the corporeal realities of US slavery, and in many ways this, too, took place at the locus of women's bodies.¹⁸ Community coherence cannot survive amidst the dismemberment of people and the burning of their homes and crops as punishment for disobedience or to sow terror and persuade them to work for nothing.¹⁹

In Congo today, village men who fail to obey the mineral delivery instructions of armed groups, be they Congolese soldiers, militias, or their own civilian employers, can be punished. The punishment can include their own rape and the rape of women from their families and villages. Local leaders are still being killed with impunity. As during the Leopold era, the overall effect is to generate terror - a constant sense of menace from the state and private armed actors, which ensures compliance most of the time from most of the population to the dominant forces controlling the guns and resources. Like US slavery, the rape of Congolese women intersects with a thriving system of economic coercion and gain that turns massive profits for a few. In the Deep South and in eastern Congo, both, it is no exaggeration to say that "women's bodies are the battleground of...economic war."²⁰

Under Leopold, laws requiring absolute obedience from all "native" people effectively allowed cruel punishment and violence to go unpunished. Local agents representing the king and commercial companies could exercise extreme violence, including public whippings, the chaining together of people, and forcing natives to do the most dangerous kind of work. Overseen by European agents working for various companies and for the king, the Force Publique itself was composed of Africans who were recruited by force and through kidnappings.²¹

In this way, the conditions under which Congo's communities exist - one of constant "threat of violence or other forms of punishment" - is nothing new.²² The kinds of threats, cruel acts of public physical punishment, and sexual violence as a weapon of social regulation, parallel the well-documented economy of entrenched violence and communal control that occurred in the US from the period of legalized slavery on through the Jim Crow-ruled South, which scholars argues continues to this day.²³

In 2010, it was estimated that almost half the working population of eastern DRC involved in mining had been in a situation of forced labor (in some cases amounting to slavery) at some point over the previous two years.²⁴ It is documented that “in the Kivu provinces, almost every mining deposit [was] controlled by a military group,”²⁵ according to the UN Group of Experts on the DRC. Reports abound concerning DRC’s enslaving economy. According to UNICEF, child labor remains common in DRC, and “more than a quarter of children aged 5 to 14 are working,” many in slavery-like conditions.²⁶ One Amnesty International report showed evidence of harvest looting, medical supply and food aid theft, extortion and “taxation” of civilians, forced labor, and displacement all performed in combination with sexual exploitation.²⁷

A case in point comes from the Rwandan post-genocide period in eastern DRC. In 2002, a boom in coltan mining saw farmers shifting “into mining communities,” whereby they began “exploiting their own lands, selling it in concessions to speculators or dispersing as itinerant miners.” According to Amnesty International, an “estimated 95 per cent of those involved were drawn from the region’s rural poor, and civilian miners may have numbered up to 50,000 during the boom.”²⁸ This movement of people has brought with it the “seemingly unstoppable flow of small arms and light weapons into the region,” helping to fuel armed conflict and militia operations.²⁹ Rather than food, weapons are stockpiled in silos, and small arms are common currency throughout the region.

Middlemen control communication with outside traders and markets. They are in a privileged position, helping to set terms and conditions along this commodity chain. Wherever possible, military forces control mines directly. Soldiers of all stripes are paid low wages, if any. “The buyer pays the leader of the armed group for the transport, and the commander then sends out troops to abduct and force individuals to carry the bags, without pay or choice.”³⁰ This is how the system in Congo works today, similarly to over a century ago.

Under Leopold, exploitation was mostly confined to the coffers of the king and eventually the Belgian colonial regime. Today global networks in mineral trading overlap where the needs of armed groups and humanitarian organizations are concerned. As Austin reveals:

Cargo companies based in Europe, South Africa and China that have been involved in the shipments of military equipment to governments or sub-state actors in the Great Lakes area have also been contracted to carry humanitarian relief supplies for some of the international aid agencies.³¹

Senior army and government officials in Uganda, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe have been involved in trading minerals mined illegally in DRC. While all deny their involvement, the minerals from Congo still: “end up for sale in jewelers across the globe, and [in]...our mobile phones.”³² Legitimate global businesses are the main buyers of resources mined in DRC. Mining remains at the heart of the Congolese economy, providing three quarters of DRC’s export revenue and employing an estimated million workers. Yet among them, only 35,000 are formally registered.³³

Winds of Change?

Up until recently, it seemed that DRC would exist in limbo where international accountability for resource extraction was concerned. Ideally, such accountability would foresee:

international measures to ensure that...global companies are not undermining poverty reduction goals by maximizing their profits through negotiating tax exemptions, skewed profit sharing arrangements, or cutting corners on property rights, human rights, environmental and labor standards.³⁴

For too long since the formal end of Belgian control, global economic interests have continued to override genuine concern for the wellbeing of Congolese people. And yet, change is seemingly on the rise. Recently, the Enough Project made claims that demilitarization is rapidly happening in all mineral mines in eastern DRC except in the gold sector.³⁵

All phone- and computer-related rare minerals are, it seems, now being traded “freely,” without the mines being controlled by armed soldiers who can use violence on civilians to enforce their exclusive control.

Enforcement of Section 1502 - based on an earlier conflict minerals bill forwarded by then US senator Barack Obama, of the much larger Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act - has at least raised the issue of the violence caused by historical investment in present-day DRC. Section 1502 was finally passed by US Congress in 2012, aiming “to create clean and transparent supply chains that do not source minerals from conflict mines in eastern Congo or contribute to the ongoing violence by indirectly funding armed groups.”³⁶ Some might say this is rather rich, given that US and other Western corporations have, from the start, determined the violent predatory economic system in place in Congo. However, this provision does provide for the traceability of most minerals mined in eastern DRC.

According to research by the Washington, DC-based Enough Project, an advocacy organization created in 2006 by Africa experts, by 2014, armed groups were no longer controlling the mines or trading ICT-related minerals through force of arms in mines, at least in the Kivus and Ituri. In a footnote, an Enough Project report explains that control of mines by armed groups is no longer the norm thanks to a strategy that involved huge multinational companies, from Apple and Google to Nokia and Philips, as well as the Congolese mining cooperative.³⁷ Of course, the creation of a watchdog-cum-advocacy group that “conducts field research in conflict zones, develops and advocates for policy recommendations, supports social movements in affected countries, and mobilizes public campaigns” also reflects the interests of US capital in securing so-called clean minerals to avoid consumer complaints. “Celebrity upstanders” are cited on the Enough Project website as supporters of its work in “Congo, Sudan, and communities affected by the LRA.”

The report expresses the discourse of “clean consumerism” incentivizing most efforts nowadays to discipline corporate capitalism internationally.

We at the Enough Project believe that companies that use conflict minerals—mainly electronics and jewelry companies—should thoroughly trace and audit their supply chains to ensure that their products are not financing atrocities in eastern Congo. In addition, it is critical to build up a clean minerals trade in Congo so that miners can work in decent conditions, and the minerals can go toward benefiting communities instead of warlords. The certification system for minerals in Congo and the region must be strengthened so that companies can purchase clean, conflict-free minerals from Congo and the region.³⁸

Meanwhile, the Enough Project’s website also cites:

Rules and regulations for companies affected by 1502 were supposed to be released on April 17, 2011, along with a rule requiring oil, gas, and mining companies to disclose payments to governments. However, delays caused by companies, bureaucratic processes, and the threat of a lawsuit by the Chamber of Commerce have pushed back the release of the rules for a full year.

After one year’s delay and threats from industry, the proposal for these regulations was adopted in 2012. Following this logic, if the Dodd-Frank provisions on IT-related conflict minerals are indeed having a positive impact on the reduction of violence in the Kivus and Ituri, as is claimed, then we expect a crucial corollary. That is, we should also witness a reduction in sexual violence, which we have suggested follows a mainly economics logic. As women’s organizations in eastern DRC seek to promote respect for gender-based justice, bringing those accused of rape to trial, however painfully slowly this is happening, it is to be hoped that norms of social relations can start to move away from the use of routine violence to achieve ‘normal’ economic ends of gaining a workforce, or finding a market outlet.³⁹

If these winds of change are to mean much on the ground in DRC, they will need to be centered on the views and growing mobilization of local civilians. This particularly concerns women, but also includes in its equation men, clergy, and human rights activists, who are constantly challenging the making of money through routinized physical violence. The majority's exclusion from safety, security, basic levels of wealth - all of which is appropriated by a tiny minority and key global economic actors - means that wealth is still visibly and violently acquired on the backs of the poor. On top of that, sexual violence is endemic to this systematized use of force.

To be held captive solely for the purposes of profit for various global and local interests is nobody's destiny or duty. Enslavement cannot be gently reformed through gentlemen's agreements - too many interests are at stake. It is vital, therefore, to pay more attention to what women themselves are saying in eastern DRC and across the region. Doing so, we are likelier to grasp how economic interests, global trade, and sexual violence are viewed from within today's eastern DRC, and how this long-standing nexus can eventually be broken.⁴⁰

Arguably, the single major obstacle to peace and justice in DRC, especially in the country's east, is an economic system that is still based, like the colonial pillage economy, on forced labor, sexual assault, and a combination of physical coercion of every kind by armed economic actors. In the long-term, "a complete reform of the economic, political, and social structures of the DRC is necessary to tackle the problems of underdevelopment and poverty." Where sexual violence is concerned, recent legislative reforms at least hold a candle for positive change in the workings of the liberal empire.⁴¹

Notes

¹ BBC (2010) UN DR Congo 'genocide' draft report - key excerpts. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-africa-11111578>

² See Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People's History* (London/New York: Zed Books, 2002), which won the Best Book Award of the African Politics Conference Group (APCG) for 2003

³ P. W. Singer, "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security", *International Security* 26: 3 (2001/2002) 186-220.

⁴ Free the Slaves, "The Congo Report: Slavery in Conflict Minerals" (Free the Slaves 2011) 6, <https://www.freetheslaves.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/The-Congo-Report-English.pdf>.

⁵ Rosana Smits and Serena Cruz, "Increasing Security in the DR Congo: Gender Responsive Strategies for Combating Sexual Violence," Clingendael Conflict Research Unit Policy Brief #17 (2011). http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20110531_cru_policybrief_rsmits.pdf.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Sara Meger, "Minerals and Masculinity: A New Understanding of Sexual Violence in War from the Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo," PhD diss., University of Melbourne (2012) 102-105.

⁹ W. McGaffey, *Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives*. Edited by Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff 1977 - Univ of Wisconsin Press, p 199. <http://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/1502.htm>

¹⁰ Meger (2012).

¹¹ Smits and Cruz (2011).

¹² Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (New York: Mariner Books, 1998); op. cit. Nzongola-Ntalaja.

¹³ Dorothy Roberts, *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999) chapter 2.

¹⁴ Zoë Marriage, "Flip-Flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier: Demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *Conflict, Security and Development* 7: 2 (2007) 281-309.

¹⁵ See Chris Huggins and Johan Pottier, "Land Tenure, Land Reform and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards a Research Agenda," in *From the Ground Up: Land Rights, Conflicts and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, edited by Chris Huggins and Jenny Clover/African Centre for Technology Studies (Nairobi: ACTS/ISS, 2005) 383-392.

¹⁶ Hochschild (1998: 159-162).

¹⁷ Hochschild (1998: 162).

¹⁸ Roberts 1999: chapter 2; also Hochschild (1998: 160-163).

¹⁹ Chris Dolan, Refuge Law Project Report, 2014. <http://www.refugeelawproject.org/resources/briefing-notes-and-special-reports/11-sprpts-gender/12-into-the-mainstream-addressing-sexual-violence-against-men-and-boys-in-conflict.html>

²⁰ Dominique Sogue, "Rape Crisis in East Congo Tied to Mining Activity," Women's eNews June 1, 2009, <http://www.womensenews.org/story/090601/rape-crisis-in-east-congo-tied-mining-activity>. Note in particular: "The major beneficiaries have been senior members of the Ugandan and Rwandese armed forces, foreign businesses and leaders of armed political groups."

²¹ Hochschild (1998: 123). Note in particular: "The framework of control that Leopold extended across his enormous realm was military."

²² See the Human Rights Education Association website on Slavery and Forced Labour: http://www.hrea.org/erc/Library/display_doc.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.hrea.org%2Ferc%2FLibrary%2Fsecondary%2Fslavery-factsheet.pdf&external=N

²³ Bouie (2014).

²⁴ According to the report by Free the Slaves (2011: 10): "Statistics presented on the artisanal mining population are based on data gathered from a non-random sample of 354 men, women and children in the Bisie mine, 177 children in Omate, and 211 children in Bibatama. Data collection was conducted over a three-month period, from July to September 2010."

²⁵ UNICEF, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Background," http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/drcongo_636.html; see also Charles Lavery, "The Valuable Ore Is Sold for £300 a Kilo but the Young Slaves Risking Death to Mine It Get Just £1.50 a Week," International Labour Rights Forum July 6, 2008, <http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/news/11648>.

²⁶ UNICEF, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Background," http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/drcongo_636.html; see also Charles Lavery, "The Valuable Ore Is Sold for £300 a Kilo but the Young Slaves Risking Death to Mine It Get Just £1.50 a Week," International Labour Rights Forum July 6, 2008, <http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/news/11648>.

²⁷ Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: 'Our Brothers Who Help Kill Us': Economic Exploitation and Human Rights Abuses in the East," March 31, 2003, <http://amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR62/010/2003/en>.

²⁸ Amnesty International (2003: 29).

²⁹ Kathi Austin, "Light Weapons and Conflict in the Great Lakes Region of Africa," in *Light Weapons and Civil Conflict*, edited by Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 1999) 29-47; quotation from p. 29.

³⁰ Free the Slaves (2011: 12).

³¹ Austin (1999: 39).

³² Hintjes Helen. Conflict and resources in post-genocide Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. *International Journal of Environmental Studies*. Volume 63, Issue 5, 2006, p. 611 <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00207230600963817?tab=permissions>

³³ Colette Braeckman, "Congo's Abandoned Miners," *Le Monde Diplomatique* July 2006, <http://mondediplo.com/2006/07/06congo>.

³⁴ House of Commons International Development Committee, "Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC and Rwanda: Twelfth Report of Session 2010-12," House of Commons (2012) 8, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/1133/1133vw.pdf>.

³⁵ Fidel Bafilemba, Timo Mueller, and Sasha Lezhnev, "The Impact of Dodd-Frank and Conflict Minerals Reforms on Eastern Congo's Conflict," The Enough Project June 2014, <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Enough%20Project%20-%20The%20Impact%20of%20Dodd-Frank%20and%20Conflict%20Minerals%20Reforms%20on%20Eastern%20Congo%E2%80%99s%20Conflict%2010June2014.pdf>.

³⁶ Mollie Zapata, "A Win for Activism: SEC Finally Sets Date to Vote on Dodd-Frank Section 1502," Enough Project July 3, 2012, <http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/win-activism-securities-and-exchanges-commission-finally-sets-date-vote-dodd-frank-section>.

³⁷ Bafilemba, Mueller, and Lezhnev (2014: 21 note 13). Full note as follows: Solutions for Hope 2 project in Rubaya (North Kivu), three mines at the Solutions for Hope project in northern Katanga, one mine at the Kemet project in Katanga, and one mine at the Conflict-free Tin Initiative in South Kivu. The projects are fully traceable, and they use the iTSCi process. The companies involved include Motorola Solutions, AVX, Apple, Intel, Blackberry, HP, Nokia, Fairphone, Motorola Mobility (Google), Flextronics, Foxconn, Global Advanced Metals, Kemet, AIM Metals & Alloys, Alpha, Malaysia Smelting Corporation (MSC), Philips, Tata Steel, Traxys, Mining Minerals Resources (MMR), F&X, as well as the Congolese mining cooperative Coopérative Des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo (CDMC). For more information, see www.resolve.org.

³⁸ “Conflict Minerals,” Raise Hope for Congo, <http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/conflict-minerals>.

³⁹ Zapata (2012) at <http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/blog/post/win-activism-sec-finally-sets-date-vote-dodd-frank-section-1502>.

⁴⁰ Bafilemba, Mueller, and Lezhnev (2014).

⁴¹ Malokele Nanivazo, “Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” United Nations University, May 24, 2012, <http://unu.edu/publications/articles/sexual-violence-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo.html>.